Gender norms, work hours, and corrective taxation  by Aronsson, Thomas & Granlund, David
Journal of Behavioral and Experimental Economics 56 (2015) 33–39
Contents lists available at ScienceDirect
Journal of Behavioral and Experimental Economics
journal homepage: www.elsevier.com/locate/socec
Gender norms, work hours, and corrective taxation
Thomas Aronsson, David Granlund∗
Department of Economics, Umeå School of Business and Economics, Umeå University, SE-901 87 Umeå, Sweden
a r t i c l e i n f o
Article history:
Received 16 December 2013
Revised 5 March 2015
Accepted 5 March 2015
Available online 12 March 2015
JEL Classﬁcation:
D03
D13
D60
D62
H21
Keywords:
Social norms
Household production
Optimal taxation
a b s t r a c t
This paper deals with optimal income taxation based on a household model, where men and women allocate
their timebetweenmarketwork andhousehold production, andwhere households differ depending onwhich
spouse has the comparative advantage in market work. The purpose is to analyze the tax policy implications
of gender norms represented by a market work norm for men and household work norm for women. We
show how the optimal (corrective) tax policy depends on the deﬁnition of social norms, the preferences for
obeying these norms, and whether men or women have the comparative advantage in market work. Two
extreme results are that (i) corrective taxation should not be used at all if the norms are based on the mean
value ofmarket work and householdwork, respectively, given that all households have the same preferences,
and (ii) only the majority household type should be taxed at the margin if the norms are instead based on the
modal value.
© 2015 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.
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2. Introduction
Although women’s hours of market work and men’s contribution
o household work have increased during the latest decades, women
till do considerablymore householdwork and lessmarketwork than
en. According to the U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics (2010), US wives
o 80% more household work and spend one third less time in mar-
et work than their husbands. Also, women working full time in the
abor market seem to domore household work than their male coun-
erparts (Berardo, Shehan, and Gerald, 1987; Gershuny and Sullivan,
003; Sullivan, 2000). Therefore, Becker’s (1981) description of an ef-
cient household, where the allocation of time between household
ork and market work is based solely on comparative advantage,
ight not give the whole picture. Instead, a considerable amount
f evidence suggests that gender norms, or gender ideology more
enerally, are also important determinants of how spouses allocate
heir time (e.g., Bianchi et al., 2000; Geist, 2005; Greenstein, 1996;
errucci et al., 1978; Romme, 1990; Ross, 1987). Gender norms may
ead to lower utility through the (perceived) costs of deviating from
he behavior prescribed by the norms. They may also reduce wel-
are through their inﬂuence on household behavior; e.g., by making
omen with a comparative advantage in market work, relative to
heir husbands, specialize in household work. For these reasons, it∗ Corresponding author. Tel.: +46 907869940.
E-mail addresses: thomas.aronsson@econ.umu.se (T. Aronsson),
avid.granlund@econ.umu.se (D. Granlund).
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214-8043/© 2015 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.s relevant to analyze the policy incentives associated with gender
orms and their effects on household behavior.
The purpose of the present paper is to analyze how gender norms,
easured as a market work norm for men and household work norm
or women, affect the incentives underlying optimal income taxation
f households. The literature on optimal income taxation of couples
nly includes a few earlier studies; none of them incorporating ef-
ects of social interaction. Instead, major issues in this literature are
hether joint taxation of couples is optimal (Brett, 2007; Cremer
t al., 2007; Schroyen, 2003), and how secondary earnings ought to be
axed (Kleven et al., 2009). Our paper differs from the aforementioned
tudies primarily by focusing on the tax policy implications of work-
elated gender norms. We consider a model with two household-
ypes, which differ with respect to whether the man or the woman
as the comparative advantage in market work, i.e., earns the higher
efore-taxwage rate. In each household, theman andwoman allocate
heir respective time-endowment between market work, household
roduction, and leisure, and the time spent in household produc-
ion generates a household public good. The analysis will be carried
ut for a welfarist government, whose objective function accurately
eﬂects the preferences of the households combined into a social wel-
are function. Therefore, the government attempts to internalize the
xternalities caused by the social norms.11 In the working paper version of the paper (Aronsson and Granlund, 2013), we
lso analyze the optimal tax policy of a paternalist (or non-welfarist) government
hat disregards the disutility perceived by each household if deviating from the social
orms.
34 T. Aronsson, D. Granlund / Journal of Behavioral and Experimental Economics 56 (2015) 33–39
t
t
d
t
b
a
p
s
(
t
w
h
b
p
h
h
g
t
d
2
s
b
t
b
e
s
h
U
w
d
t
h
a
i
n
s
s
s
5 See Blomquist (1993) for an early theoretical study of interdependent behaviorWemodel the gender norms as a market work norm for men and
a household work norm for women, as we interpret the evidence
reported for the United States by Ross (1987) and Bianchi et al. (2000)
and those reported by Geist (2005) for ten developed countries as
supporting the existence of such norms. These scholars base their
assessments of gender norms on the extent to which respondents
agree or disagree with statements like “It is much better for everyone
if the man earns the main living and the woman takes care of the home
and family” and “Preschool children are likely to suffer if their mother is
employed.” 2 In short, the responses suggest that such gender norms
may exist, according to which the man should be the main achiever
outside the home, while the woman’s main responsibility is to take
care of the home and family.
There is also evidence showing that gender related work norms
have changedquite rapidly. For example, Brewster andPadavic (2000)
ﬁnd that the proportion of American respondents that agree with the
statement “Preschool children are likely to suffer if their mother is
employed” has dropped from 70 to 54% between 1977 and 1985 and
ﬁnd similar changes for other gender norm questions. Several so-
ciological studies (e.g., Brewster and Padavic, 2000; Mason and Lu,
1988; Thornton et al., 1983) suggest that these changes can be driven
by changes in the actual division between paid and unpaid work, in
particular the large change in women’s time allocation. Based on this
literature, we model the norms as a weighted average of the time
women in different household-types spend in household work and
a weighted average of the time men in different household-types
spend in market work, respectively. This is a very general approach,
as it only restricts the norms to be in the range of observed be-
havior. Two interesting special cases – with very different implica-
tions for tax policy – follow when the norms are based on mean
value and modal value, respectively, for market work and household
work.3
It has also been recognized that the interdependencies among
households in the gender division of work can be explained by gen-
der identity, i.e., doing tasks that are normal for one’s gender will
strengthen one’s gender identity (seeHook, 2006; Bianchi et al., 2000;
Sani, 2014). For this reason, we model the norms as based on within-
gender comparisons, even though an aﬃrmative answer to the state-
ment that “...the man earns the main living...” may also be consistent
with across gender comparisons.
Our paper is also related to economics literature showing that
social norms affect individual behavior. More speciﬁcally, both the
obedience and disobedience of such norms are associated with costs
to the individual; the former in terms of lost “intrinsic” utility (which
reﬂects the objective that the consumer would maximize in the ab-
sence of social norms), and the latter in terms of lost utility through
deviation from the behavior that norm obedience requires.4 As such,
and in line with the empirical evidence discussed above, endoge-
nous social norms may lead to interdependent behavior as well as a2 Bianchi et al. (2000) use the answers to four questions included in the US National
Survey of Families and Households; the two stated in the text and “It is all right for
mothers to work full time when their youngest child is under 5”; and “A husband whose
wife is working full-time should spend just as many hours doing housework as his wife.”
Geist (2005) used four questions from the International Social Survey Program: two
questions are similar to the ﬁrst two used by Bianchi et al. and one is a reversed
formulation of the ﬁrst of these. The last is “All in all, family life suffers if the woman
has a full-time job.” The six questions used by Ross are similar, see Ross (1987, p. 823).
3 Mean value norms are based on the assumption that all people contributing to a
speciﬁc normwill do so to the same extent, which is in linewithmuch of the economics
literature on externalities (which typically focuses on “atmospheric” externalities). Yet,
it is not necessarily the case that all group members contribute to the same extent to
the norm. Group normsmay, instead, reﬂect similarities within the group and possibly
also differences to other groups (e.g., Hogg and Reid, 2006). In our simplemodel, modal
norms will have this character, since they are based on the behavior of the majority
within the group.
4 See, e.g., Akerlof (1980) and Bernheim (1994).
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pendency toward conformity.5 These are aspects that our model at-
empts to capture. To our knowledge, however, the only earlier study
ealing with the effects of labor market related social norms on op-
imal income tax policy is Aronsson and Sjögren (2010), which is
ased on a model with single-individual households.6 They focus on
norm for the hours of market work in combination with a partici-
ation norm (that one should earn one’s living from work instead of
ocial beneﬁts). Our study differs from theirs in at least three ways:
i) we consider a household model where each household contains
womembers; (ii) ourmodel contains household production; and (iii)
e consider a mix of norms referring to market work for males and
ousehold work for females.
The outline of the study is as follows. In Section 2, we present the
asic structure of the model, where each household decides upon its
rivate consumption as well as the time spent in market work and
ousehold work by the male and female, and also characterize the
ousehold choices conditional on the tax policy decided upon by the
overnment. Section 3 contains the optimal tax problem as well as
he outcome in terms of optimal marginal taxes. We summarize and
iscuss the results in Section 4.
. The model
The economy consists of two household-types, denoted by sub-
cripts 1 and 2, each of which comprises a male and female, denoted
y subscriptm and f, respectively. The households differ with respect
o themember’s earnings potential in the labormarket as represented
y the before-tax hourly wage rates: in households of type 1 the man
arns wh and the woman wl < wh; in households of type 2 the oppo-
ite holds, i.e. the man earns wl and the woman wh. The number of
ouseholds of type j is denoted nj.
The utility function facing a household of type j is given by
j = ac(cj)+ ax(xj)+ am(zjm)+ af (zjf )−
1
2
ρj[jm − m]2
−1
2
κj[djf − df ]2 for j = 1,2, (1)
here c denotes private consumption, x denotes a domestically pro-
uced household public good, and z denotes leisure. Leisure is, in
urn, deﬁned as a time endowment, , less the time spent in house-
old work, d, and in market work, , such that zjm =  − jm − djm
nd zjf =  − jf − djf . The functions ac, ax, am, and af , are all increas-
ng in their respective argument, strictly concave, and all goods are
ormal. The additive utility function allows us to derive comparative
tatics for the hours of work spent in household production (which
impliﬁes the interpretation of the results); it is not important for the
tructure of the tax formulas derived below.7n terms the labor supply, showing that endogenous social norms have important
mplications for the effects of taxes on work hours. In his study, the norm is measured
s the average action (labor supply and consumption, respectively) in the population as
whole. See also Fischer andHuddart (2008) for a similar approach to norm formation;
et in another context. A conformity norm for leisure, common to men and women, is
nalyzed by Burda et al. (2007) in an attempt to explain the close similarity between
en and women with respect to the total working time (the sum of market work and
ousehold work). Grodner and Kniesner (2006) analyze how economic policy affects
he labor supply inmodelswith social interactions. They showthat the socialmultiplier,
.e. the multiplier that is caused by endogenous norms, can be quite substantial also
or the relatively low values of the loss parameter that they consider. Aronsson et al.
1999) present empirical evidence suggesting that this multiplier is, indeed, very large.
6 Other literature examines the implications of social norms for redistribution policy
nd social insurance; see, e.g., Lindbeck et al. (1999); 2003). In their studies, the cost
o the individual of deviating from an employment norm decreases with the share of
eneﬁt recipients in society.
7 We have chosen to use a household utility function for simplicity, since it guar-
ntees internal eﬃciency within the households. Identical solutions to the ones de-
ived below can be obtainedwith individual utility functions and cooperative behavior
mong the household members, given that both spouses have the same bargaining
ower.
T. Aronsson, D. Granlund / Journal of Behavioral and Experimental Economics 56 (2015) 33–39 35
s
w
i
o
t
i
w
β
w

v
g
t
e
n
h
a
i
a
∂
s
T
h
m
m
s
h
t
2
m
a
w
a
p
h
c
w
T
a
f
m
f
m
s
d
u
E
t

s
m
t
t
i
a
−
−
o
h
m
h
ω
W
c
w
B
E
d
s
f
f
d
T
A
h
h
s
i
s
ﬁ
d
a
a
3
w
A
h
d
r
eThe ﬁfth part of Eq. (1), − 12ρj
[
jm − m
]2
, is a loss function, de-
cribing the utility loss of deviating from the norm for men’s market
ork. We assume that m =
[
βl1m +
(
1 − βl
)
2m
]
, where βl [0,1] ,
.e. the market work norm for men is given by a weighted average
f the hours of market work supplied by men in the two household-
ypes. Similarly, the ﬁnal part of Eq. (1) describes the correspond-
ng utility loss of deviating from the norm for women’s household
ork. By analogy, we assume that df =
[
βdd1f +
(
1 − βd
)
d2f
]
, where
d [0,1]. Two special cases analyzed below are mean value norms
here βl = βd = n1/(n1 + n2), and modal value norms such that
m = im and df = dif ifni > nk. Note that the parametersρj andκj may
arywith household-type, meaning that themodel allows for hetero-
eneity among types in preference for obeying the social norms (and,
herefore, also in the behavioral response to these norms).8 This het-
rogeneity plays an important role below. Also, although the social
orms are endogenous in the model, we assume that each house-
old treats them as exogenous, meaning that the households behave
tomistically.
The household production function, xj = q(djm, djf ), is increasing
n each argument and strictly concave. Since household work by men
nd women are likely to be close substitutes, we also assume that
2xj/∂djm∂djf < 0. Following Schroyen (2003), we do not consider a
cenario where close substitutes to xj can be bought in the market.
he reason is that at least part ofwhat is typically thought of as house-
old public goods, such as a pleasant and caring home environment,
ight be diﬃcult to accomplish solely through hired help. Further-
ore, since such activities are not likely to be left entirely to one of the
pouses, we will not analyze corner solutions in the choices of house-
old work in what follows. Neither do we analyze corner solutions in
he choices of market work.
.1. Household choices
Let wjm and wjf denote the before-tax hourly wage rates of the
an and woman, respectively, in household-type j: as mentioned
bove, for households of type 1, we have w1m = wh and w1f = wl,
hereas for households of type 2 the opposite applies so w2m = wl
nd w2f = wh, where wh > wl. Also, suppose that income taxes are
aid according to a ﬂexible nonlinear schedule, and let T denote the
ousehold’s income tax payment. The household budget constraint
an then be written as
jmjm + wjf jf − T(wjmjm,wjf jf )− cj = 0 for j = 1,2. (2)
he tax function implies that individuals’ marginal taxes may depend
lso on their spouse’s income, and the two spouses typically face dif-
erent marginal income tax rates. In the presence of gender norms,
en andwomenwill typically differ in terms of gross earning. There-
ore, the government may implement different marginal taxes for
en and women just by allowing the marginal taxes for primary and
econdary earners to depend on the gross earnings, without using
ifferent tax schedules for men and women.
Each household chooses cj, jm, jf , djm and djf to maximize its
tility function in Eq. (1) subject to the budget constraint given by
q. (2), as well as subject to the household production function and
he following time constraints:
= zjs + djs + js for j = 1,2 and s = m, f . (3)
Letωjs = wjs[1 − T ′js] denote the marginal wage rate facing spouse
in household-type j, where T ′
js
= ∂T(wjmjm,wjf jf )/∂
(
wjsjs
)
is the
arginal income tax rate. Using the short notation uj = ac(cj)+8 A possibly realistic extension would be to assume that the norms may vary be-
ween groups of households. However, since the model only distinguishes between
wo household-types, we refrain from such an extension here. This is an interesting
ssue for future research.
t
t
p
ox(xj)+ am(zjm)+ af (zjf ) , the ﬁrst order conditions can be written
∂uj
∂cj
ωjm −
∂uj
∂zjm
− ρj[jm − m] = 0 (4)
∂uj
∂cj
ωjf −
∂uj
∂zjf
= 0 (5)
∂uj
∂zjm
+ ∂uj
∂xj
∂xj
∂djm
= 0 (6)
∂uj
∂zjf
+ ∂uj
∂xj
∂xj
∂djf
− κj[djf − df ] = 0. (7)
Notice ﬁrst that in the absence of gender norms, the allocation
f labor within each household would be determined by the house-
old members’ comparative advantages, meaning that the relative
arginal wage rate would equal the relative marginal productivity in
ousehold work such that
jm/ωjf =
∂xj
∂djm
/
∂xj
∂djf
. (8)
e may think of Eq. (8) as representing a production eﬃcient out-
ome, as it is analogous to optimality condition for time-allocation
ithin the household derived in standard models without norms (c.f.
ecker, 1981).
For the analysis to be carried out later, it is convenient to solve
qs. (6) and (7) for djm and djf as functions of jm, jf , and df . Note that
jm and djf are not functions of cj since the utility function is additively
eparable,meaning that cj doesnot appear in theﬁrst order conditions
or djm and djf . This gives the following conditional supply functions
or the hours spent in household production:
js = djs(jm, jf ,df ) for j = 1,2 and s = m, f . (9)
he comparative statics of the conditional supply functions are
∂djm
∂jm
< 0,
∂djm
∂jf
> 0 and
∂djm
∂df
< 0
(10)
∂djf
∂jm
> 0,
∂djf
∂jf
< 0 and
∂djf
∂df
> 0.
ccording to (10), an increase in the hours of market work by either
ousehold member reduces the time that this individual spends in
ousehold production, and increases the time the individual’s spouse
pends in household production, ceteris paribus.9 Furthermore, an
ncrease in the householdwork norm for women implies that women
pend more time and men less time in household production.
The production sector is competitive and consists of identical
rms, which use high- and low-productivity labor as the only pro-
uction factors. To avoid unnecessary complications, we also assume
linear technology such that the before-tax wage rates, wl and wh,
re ﬁxed.
. Optimal tax policy
We assume that the government attempts to maximize a social
elfare function where all households are given the same weight.
s we focus on corrective aspects of tax policy we also assume that
ousehold-types are observable such that the government can re-
istribute between them on a lump-sum basis. Therefore, the only
eason for distorting the labor supply behavior is to correct for the
ffects of social norms.9 This is consistent with empirical evidence presented in Sullivan (2000), who found
hat an increase in the hours of market work by the wife implies that she spends less
ime in household production, and that her husband spends more time in household
roduction. Sullivan did not analyze the effects of changes in the hours of market work
f husbands.
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10 Sullivan (2000, Table 5) ﬁnds that women who work part time instead of full time
do 69 min more household work per day, while their husbands only do 13 min less
household work per day, on average.Theobjective of the government is a conventionalUtilitarian social
welfare function, which is given by
W =
∑
j
njUj (11)
where Uj denotes the utility function of a household of type j, as
given in Eq. (1), and (as mentioned above) nj denotes the number of
households of type j. As such, the government recognizes the utility
loss faced by each household if deviating from the social norms and
will, therefore, try to internalize theexternalities that the social norms
give rise to.
Notice once again that T(·) is a nonlinear tax, through which
the government is able to implement any desired combination
of market work for both individuals and private consumption in
each household-type. It is, therefore, convenient to write the pub-
lic decision-problem as a direct decision-problem, i.e. as if the gov-
ernment directly decides upon the hours of market work for the
man and woman, respectively, and the private consumption in each
household-type. The marginal income tax rates that will implement
the social optimum can then be derived by combining the ﬁrst order
conditions of the public decision-problem with those characterizing
the households. Therefore, the government’s budget constraint will
be written in terms of work hours and consumption as follows:∑
j
nj[wjmjm + wjf jf − cj] = 0. (12)
Instead of substituting the response functions for djm and djf given
in Eq. (9) into the objective function, we follow the equivalent ap-
proach of introducing the response functions as separate restrictions.
Thismeans that the government’s decision-problemcan be expressed
as choosing c for each household type and choosing  and d for both
individuals in each household. The Lagrangean can then be written
as
L = W + γ
∑
j
nj{wjmjm + wjf jf − cj}
+
∑
j
[μjm{djm − djm(jm, jf ,df )}
+μjf {djf − djf (jm, jf ,df )}]. (13)
The ﬁrst order conditions are given in Appendix A. We will now use
these ﬁrst order conditions to characterize the optimal tax policy.
Since the welfare effects of changes in the social norms play a key
role in the analysis, we begin by brieﬂy characterizing these welfare
effects. By using that the Lagrangean is equal to the welfare function
at the social optimum, i.e. W = L, we show in Appendix A that the
welfare effect of an increase in df and m, respectively, can be written
as
∂W
∂df
=
∑
j njκj[djf − df ]
1 − ∂d1f
∂df
βd − ∂d2f∂df (1 − βd)
(14)
∂W
∂m
=
∑
j
njρj[jm − m]. (15)
Eq. (14) implies that thewelfare effect of an increase in the household
work norm depends on a weighted sum of differences between the
actual time spent in household work by women and the behavior
prescribed by the norm, ceteris paribus. Similarly, Eq. (15) means
that the corresponding effect of an increase in the market work norm
depends on aweighted sumof differences between the actual number
of hours spent in market work bymen and the number of work hours
implied by the norm. The only difference between Eqs. (14) and (15)
refers to the feedback effect in the denominator of Eq. (14), which
arises due to that the conditional supply of householdworkbywomen
in Eq. (9) depends directly on df . Therefore, an increase in df will both
affect welfare directly (through the term in the numerator) on theight hand side of Eq. (14) and indirectly via the conditional supply
f hours that women spend in household work (through the term in
he denominator). The intuition behind the feedback effect is that an
ncrease in df leads to an increase in the hours of household work
upplied by women (recall from (10) that ∂djf /∂df > 0 for j = 1,2)
hich, in turn, contributes to increase df even further. By analogy to
arlier research on feedback effects in models with externalities, we
ssume that the denominator of Eq. (14) is positive for anyβd ∈ [0,1],
n which case the feedback effect only affects the magnitude (not the
ign) of the welfare effect given in Eq. (14).
The optimal marginal income tax rates are characterized in
roposition 1.
roposition 1. The optimal marginal income tax rates can be written
s
′
1f = −
βd
γ n1wl
∂W
∂df
∂d1f
∂1f
(16)
′
1m = −
βd
γ n1wh
∂W
∂df
∂d1f
∂1m
− βl
γ n1wh
∂W
∂m
(17)
′
2f = −
(1 − βd)
γ n2wh
∂W
∂df
∂d2f
∂2f
(18)
′
2m = −
(1 − βd)
γ n2wl
∂W
∂df
∂d2f
∂2m
− (1 − βl)
γ n2wl
∂W
∂m
(19)
Proof: See Appendix A.
Notice ﬁrst that all marginal income tax rates depend directly on
he norm for household work, whereas terms related to the norm
or market work only affect the marginal income tax rates imposed
n men. The reason is that the income tax is a perfect instrument
or targeting the hours of market work (and, therefore, the norm for
arket work), while it is only an indirect (and imperfect) instrument
or inﬂuencing the hours of household work. As long as βd ∈ (0,1)
he marginal income tax rates faced by women will have the same
ign as ∂W/∂df . For instance, if an increase in df leads to higher
elfare, ceteris paribus, there is an incentive for the government to
ncrease the number of hours that women spend in household work
which leads to an increase in df ). In turn, this is accomplished by
iscouraging market work through higher marginal income taxation.
he argument for lower marginal income taxation is analogous if
W/∂df < 0.
For men, the ﬁrst term on the right hand side takes the opposite
ign of ∂W/∂df as long as βd ∈ (0,1). The intuition is as follows: if
W/∂df < 0, there is an incentive for the government to discour-
ge household work among women. This can be achieved by higher
arginal taxation of their husband’s labor income, which encourages
hemto substitutemarketwork forhouseholdwork. Theargument for
ower marginal income taxation is analogous if ∂W/∂df > 0. Accord-
ng to empirical evidence presented in Sullivan (2000), the amount
f time an individual spends in household work is more sensitive to
hanges in the individual’s own market work than to changes in the
pouse’s market work: for this reason, therefore, the ﬁrst term on the
ight hand side of Eq. (17) is likely to be smaller in absolute value than
he right hand side of Eq. (16), and the ﬁrst term on the right hand
ide of Eq. (19) is likely to be smaller in absolute value than the right
and side of Eq. (18).10 This size difference is reinforced in household-
ype 1 due to that theman earns the higher before-tax wage rate, and
ounteracted in household-type 2where thewoman earns the higher
efore-tax wage rate (which is seen from the denominator of the tax
ormulas).
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The second termon the right hand side in the tax formulas formen
erves to correct for the externality that each man imposes on other
ouseholds due to the social norm for market work. This marginal
ax component is proportional to the negative of ∂W/∂m. As such,
f ∂W/∂m > 0 (< 0), there is an incentive to encourage (discourage)
arket work among men through a lower (higher) marginal income
ax rate, which contributes to internalize this externality.
Note also that the marginal income tax rates imposed on women
ake the same sign for both household-types, as long as both
ousehold-types contribute to the externality associated with the
ousehold work norm, i.e. if βd ∈ (0,1). For men, on the other hand,
he marginal income tax rate may differ in sign between the two
ousehold-types if ∂W/∂m and ∂W/∂df differ in sign. The reason
s that the relative weight attached to ∂W/∂m and ∂W/∂df can
iffer across the tax formulas for the men, either because βl and
d differ from each other, and/or because ∂d1f /∂1m differs from
d2f /∂2m.
Two additional observations are worth further discussion. First,
f the social norms were exogenous (instead of being dependent on
ousehold behavior) all marginal income tax rates would be equal
o zero.11 In this case, there is no longer a problem of externalities
nd, as a consequence, no motive to use corrective taxation. Second,
ubsidized parental leave may under certain conditions be a useful
upplemental instrument to income taxation. This is seen by observ-
ng that the optimalmarginal tax rates depend on how responsive the
ours of household production of women are to changes in the hours
f market work, i.e., through the derivatives ∂djf /∂jf and ∂djf /∂jm
or j = 1,2. In reality, the magnitudes of these effects are likely to dif-
er across households. Therefore, if an increase in the householdwork
orm leads to lower welfare such that ∂W/∂df < 0, the marginal in-
ome tax for men in households with a large value of ∂djf /∂jm (e.g.,
athers of small children) should be higher (or less negative) to en-
ourage them to work less in the market work and spend more time
n household production. One way to achieve an additional reduction
n the hours of market work for men is to subsidize paternity leave.12
imilarly, if ∂djf /∂jf is more negative for womenwith small children
han for other women (which is arguably likely), and if we continue
o assume that ∂W/∂df < 0, there is an analogous argument against
ubsidizing maternity leave or for reducing the number of month of
ubsidized parental leave that mothers are allowed to utilize. This
uggests to us that the role of subsidized parental leave under gender
orms is an interesting issue for future research.
Below we consider two obvious special cases, where the social
ormsarebasedonmeanandmodal value, respectively. Considerﬁrst
ean value norms, i.e. df =
∑
j njdjf /
∑
j nj and m =
∑
j njljm/
∑
j nj.
roposition 2. With mean-value norms such that βl = βd = n1/(n1 +
2), and if the households have the same preferences in the sense that
1 = κ2 and ρ1 = ρ2, then all marginal income tax rates are zero.
roof. Use βd = n1/(n1 + n2) and κ1 = κ2 in Eq. (14), and use βl =
1/(n1 + n2) and ρ1 = ρ2 in Eq. (15). Rearrange to obtain ∂W/∂df =
W/∂m = 0. Substitution intoEqs. (16)–(19) gives T ′1m = T ′1f = T ′2m =
′
2f
= 0. 
Proposition 2 reﬂects a case where corrective taxation is not used.
he intuition is thatwithmeanvaluenorms and identical preferences,
he welfare gain to one of the household-types of an increase in the11 With exogenous norms, βd and βl in Eqs. (16 ) and (17) and
(
1 − βd
)
and
(
1 − βl
)
n Eqs. (18) and (19) should be replaced by zeros, since these components reﬂect the
ffects of d1f , 1m, d2f and 2m on the social norms.
12 In many countries fathers have had a legal right to parental leave the last decades
Hook, 2010). In, for example, Sweden and Norway, part of the subsidized parental
eave that fathers receive cannot be transferred to the mothers. See Kotsadam and
inseraas (2011) for evidence suggesting that fathers do more household work if they
ake parental leave.
P
a
n
h
f
P
horm is exactly offset by thewelfare loss for theotherhousehold-type.
herefore, with a Utilitarian social welfare function, the net effectwill
e zero.
Clearly, if we allow the preferences for norm-adjustments to
iffer across household-types, such that κ1 = κ2 and/or ρ1 = ρ2,
roposition 2will no longer apply. In that case, themean value norms
mply that Eqs. (14) and (15) reduce to read
∂W
∂df
= 1

(κ1 − κ2) n1n2
n1 + n2
(
d1f − d2f
)
(20)
∂W
∂m
= (ρ1 − ρ2) n1n2
n1 + n2 (1m − 2m) , (21)
n which we have used the short notation
= 1 − ∂d1f
∂df
n1
n1 + n2 −
∂d2f
∂df
n2
n1 + n2 > 0. (22)
Eqs. (20) and (21) show that the qualitative welfare effects of in-
reases in df and m depend on (i) which household-type experiences
he largest utility loss by deviating from the social norms and (ii) dif-
erences in work hours across household-types (household work for
omen and market work for men). To analyze the optimal tax policy
n this more general setting, note ﬁrst that d1f > d2f and 1m > 2m,
ince the norms will never fully offset the effects of comparative
dvantage. Then, if κ1 < κ2 and ρ1 < ρ2, we have ∂W/∂df < 0 and
W/∂m < 0. In this case, externality-correction calls for subsidiza-
ion of women’s market work at the margin, i.e. T ′
1f
< 0 and T ′
2f
< 0.
he intuition is that more market work reduces the time spent in
ousehold work, which brings df down to a level more in accordance
ith the preferences of household-type 2 (which in this example ex-
eriences a larger utility loss that household-type 1 if deviating from
he household work norm). Notice also that externality-correction
n this case motivates positive marginal income tax rates for men.
his is so for two reasons. First, by working fewer hours in the labor
arket, men will do more household work, which also contributes
o reduce df . Second, less market work among men decreases m to
more preferable level for household-type 2 (which experiences a
arger utility loss than household-type 1 if deviating from the market
ork norm). On the other hand, if deviations from the social norms
nstead lead to higher utility losses for household-type 1 than for
ousehold-type 2, such that κ1 > κ2 and ρ1 > ρ2, tax policy implica-
ions opposite to those described above will follow.
Notice also that if one of the household-types caresmore about de-
iations from one of the norms, while the other household-type cares
ore about deviations from the other norm, the marginal income tax
ates for women are still signed. This is so because, irrespective of the
elative sizes of ρ1 and ρ2, externality-correction calls for marginal
ubsidization of women’s market work if κ1 < κ2 and marginal tax-
tion of women’s market work if κ1 > κ2. However, if κ1 < κ2 and
1 > ρ2, or if κ1 > κ2 and ρ1 < ρ2, the two norms have opposite
ualitative effects on the marginal income tax rates implemented for
en, and it remains an empirical question which effect dominates
he other.
Let us continue with modal value norms, where df = dif and m =
im for ni > nk.
roposition 3. With modal value norms, the marginal income tax rates
re zero for women and men of the minority household-type. If n1 >
2 (n1 < n2), the marginal income tax rate for women of the majority
ousehold-type is negative (positive), and the marginal income tax rate
or men of the majority household-type is positive (negative).
roof. If household-type 1 is the majority household-type, we
ave n1 > n2, meaning that βl = βd = 1 and df = d1f and m = 1m.
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AEqs. (14) and (15) will then simplify to read
∂W
∂df
= n2κ2[d2f − d1f ](
1 − ∂d1f
∂df
) < 0 (23)
∂W
∂m
= n2ρ2[2m − 1m] < 0. (24)
Substituting into Eqs. (16)–(19) gives T ′
1f
< 0, T ′1m > 0 and T
′
2f
=
T ′2m = 0. Instead, if household-type 2 is the majority household-type,
so n1 < n2, we have βl = βd = 0 and
∂W
∂df
= n1κ1[d1f − d2f ](
1 − ∂d2f
∂df
) > 0 (25)
∂W
∂m
= n1ρ1 [1m − 2m] > 0, (26)
implying T ′
2f
> 0, T ′2m < 0 and T
′
1f
= T ′1m = 0. 
The intuition behind the ﬁrst part of the proposition is that the
minority household-typedoes not generate any externalities. As such,
there is no reason for the government to distort the labor supply
behavior of the minority household-type. The marginal income tax
rates imposed on the majority household-type serve to reduce the
differences between each norm and the corresponding number of
work hours chosen by the minority household-type which, in this
case, determines the welfare cost associated with the social norm.
Therefore, it is the minority household-type’s values of κ and ρ that
affect themarginal taxes (not the corresponding values characterizing
the majority household-type), since the majority household-type per
deﬁnition will not divert from df and m, respectively.
4. Summary and discussion
The present paper analyzes corrective tax policy in an economy
with gender-relatedwork norms, which are deﬁned as amarketwork
norm for men and household work norm for women. Such a study is
motivated by the observation that women still do considerably more
housework and spend less time in the labor market than men, de-
spite that gender equality has been on the political agenda for a long
time. Our study is based on an economy populated by households,
where men and women allocate their time between market work
and household production, and where households are divided in two
types depending on whether the man or woman has the compara-
tive advantage in market work (i.e. earns the higher before-tax wage
rate). The market work norm is deﬁned as a weighted average of the
hours of market work supplied by men in different household-types,
while the household work norm is analogously deﬁned as a weighted
average of the hours of household work supplied by women in differ-
ent household-types. As such, norms based onmean value andmodal
value constitute special cases in our framework. The policy instru-
ment faced by the government is a nonlinear tax on the income from
market work.
The take-away message from the paper is that income tax policy
has a potentially very important corrective role in economies with
gender-relatedwork norms. Our characterization ofmarginal income
tax rates implies that the optimal (corrective) tax policy depends on
the (i) deﬁnition of social norms, (ii) the preferences for obeying these
norms, and (iii) whether men or women have the comparative ad-
vantage inmarket work, andwe also explain how these threemecha-
nisms interact. Although real world tax systems typically reﬂect sev-
eral different policy objectives (and not just externality-correction
as we assume here), the results are practically useful by showing
in what direction the marginal income tax rates should change, if
governments want to internalize the social costs of gender norms. In
addition, by characterizing the structure ofmarginal income taxation,he paper also showswhat additional information policymakers need
n order to be able to respond to gender-related work norms.
With mean value norms, tax policy is used to move the (endoge-
ous) norms closer to the levels preferred by the household-type that
xperiences the largest utility loss if deviating from these norms. An
mmediate implication is that if the households have the same pref-
rences, the correctivemotive for taxation vanishes, since thewelfare
ain for one of the household-types of an increase in the value of the
orm is exactly offset by a welfare loss for the other household-type.
n the other hand, if households where the women have compar-
tive advantage in market work care most about the social norms,
omen should face negative, and men positive, marginal taxes. The
pposite tax policy implications will follow if households where the
en have comparative advantage in market work care most about
he norms. With norms based on modal value, on the other hand,
here is no corrective motive for the government to tax the minority
ousehold-type, since such households do not generate any exter-
alities. The marginal tax policy imposed on men and women of the
ajority household-type are designed to reduce the difference be-
ween the value of each norm (which, in this case, is determined by
he behavior of the majority household-type) and the corresponding
umber of work hours chosen by the households of theminority type
which are those suffering from the norm).
Future work may take several different directions. First, as we
entioned above, subsidized parental leave may be a useful supple-
ental instrument worth further examination. Second, social norms
re likely to evolve gradually over time instead of adjusting momen-
arily to policy, aswehave assumedhere. This suggests that a dynamic
odel might provide a richer framework for studying the policy im-
lications of social norms; possibly in combination with numerical
alculations to assess how the optimal corrective policiesmay change
ver time. Third, householdsmay also invest resources to reduce their
erceived cost of deviating from social norms, i.e. by altering their
erception of these norms. As such, the welfare cost to households of
eviating from such norms is likely to be reduced; yet at a cost, which
ay suggest a somewhat different role for public policy. We hope to
ddress these issues in future research.
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ppendix A
The ﬁrst order conditions for the government are written as
∂L
∂cj
= nj
∂uj
∂cj
− γ nj = 0 for j = 1,2 (A1)
∂L
∂1f
= −n1 ∂u1
∂z1f
+ γ n1wl − μ1f
∂d1f
∂1f
= 0 (A2)
∂L
∂2f
= −n2 ∂u2
∂z2f
+ γ n2wh − μ2f
∂d2f
∂2f
= 0 (A3)
∂L
∂1m
= −n1
[
∂u1
∂z1m
+ ρ1
[
1m − m
]]+ γ n1wh − μ1f ∂d1f∂1m
+
∑
j
njρj
[
jm − m
]
βl = 0 (A4)
T. Aronsson, D. Granlund / Journal of Behavioral and Experimental Economics 56 (2015) 33–39 39
w
w
i
h
w
d
T
μ
μ
a
r
w
P
a
μ
D
t
F
b
R
A
A
A
A
B
B
B
B
B
B
B
B
C
F
G
G
G
G
H
H
H
K
K
L
L
M
P
R
R
S
S
S
T
U∂L
∂2m
= −n2
[
∂u2
∂z2m
+ ρ2[2m − m]
]
+ γ n2wl − μ2f
∂d2f
∂2m
+
∑
j
njρj[jm − m](1 − βl) = 0 (A5)
∂L
∂d1f
= μ1f +
∑
j
njκj[djf − df ]βd −
∑
j
μjf
∂djf
∂df
βd = 0 (A6)
∂L
∂d2f
= μ2f +
∑
j
njκj[djf − df ](1 − βd)−
∑
j
μjf
∂djf
∂df
(1 − βd) = 0
(A7)
∂L
∂d1m
= μ1m = 0 (A8)
∂L
∂d2m
= μ2m = 0. (A9)
In Eqs. (A6) and (A7), we have used the ﬁrst order condition for
omen’s household work, i.e. Eq. (7). Similarly, in Eqs. (A8) and (A9),
e haveused theﬁrst order condition formen’s householdworkgiven
nEq. (6). Since there are no externalities associatedwith d1m and d2m,
ousehold choices give the outcome preferred by the government,
hich explains why μ1m = μ2m = 0.
Derivation of Eqs. (14) and (15).
To derive Eq. (14), take the derivative of Eq. (13) with respect to
f . This gives
∂L
∂df
=
∑
j
njκj[djf − df ] −
∑
j
μjf
∂djf
∂df
. (A10)
hen, use Eqs. (A6) and (A7) to solve for μ1f and μ2f such that
1f =
−∑j njκj[djf − df ]βd
1 − ∂d1f
∂df
βd − ∂d2f∂df
(
1 − βd
) , (A11)
2f =
−∑j njκj[djf − df ](1 − βd)
1 − ∂d1f
∂df
βd − ∂d2f∂df (1 − βd)
(A12)
nd substitute into Eq. (A10). Finally, use that ∂L/∂df = ∂W/∂df and
earrange to obtain Eq. (14).
Eq. (15) is obtained directly by taking the derivative of Eq. (13)
ith respect to m.
roof of Proposition 1. To derive Eq. (16), ﬁrst note that Eqs. (14)
nd (A11) imply
1f = −βd
∂L
∂df
. (A13)
Next, solve Eq. (A1) for n1∂u1/∂c1 and Eq. (A2) for n1∂u1/∂z1f .
ividing the latter expression by the former, while using Eq. (A13)
ogether with ∂L/∂df = ∂W/∂df gives
∂u1/∂z1f
∂u1/∂c1
− wl − βd
γ n1
∂W
∂df
∂d1f
∂1f
= 0.inally, using the household’s ﬁrst order condition for 1f , i.e., w1f −
∂u1/∂z1f
∂u1/∂c1
= T ′
1f
w1f ,gives Eq. (16). Eqs. (17), (18) and (19) canbederived
y analogous procedures. 
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